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MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (MHS) JOINT MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Military Health Systems Governance Today
The Military Health System (MHS) or the DHP is complicated, expensive and is quite often referred to as an "Enterprise". Webster defines an enterprise as "any purposeful or systematic activity with common goals and ideals" 1 . The MHS is a certainly purposeful, systematic, and possesses common goals; therefore it is an enterprise. As with any other enterprise the MHS faces challenges in budgeting, recapitalization, personnel training, recruitment, and leadership. At the same time the MHS has its own peculiar challenges not usually encountered by other corporations.
One of those challenges is the fact that the US military has clusters of beneficiaries in the form of active duty, retirees and eligible family members-both CONUS and OCONUS-representing multiple, or all, services and all requiring similar access to healthcare. These clusters are treated and serviced by the military healthcare system as Multi-Service Markets (MSMs). Multi-Service Markets as a method to consolidate medical capabilities and facilities were implemented in several places, to include the National Capital region in September of 2004. The then Commanding General of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, MG Farmer, described MSM implementation in the NCR as, the office to help link all the tri-service facilities, both big and little, in the national capital area together to form an integrated health delivery network under one health plan, with the intent to provide more seamless care for beneficiaries 2 . This is the institutional medical care aspect of the MHS which has engaged in numerous efforts over the past 25 years to better manage the delivery and coordination of health services in the "healthcare market". In addition, when more than one Military Department maintains a medical treatment facility, MSM becomes a joint enterprise.
Even though the MSM concept has emerged as a potential way to effectively deliver patient care in this environment
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, it is still a challenge to sustain roles and responsibilities of the military departments as their service equities become more of a priority.
The other aspect of the MHS is operational medicine, which provides healthcare to the joint force, plans, prepares and trains deployable medical personnel to operate in tactical environments. Operational medicine delivery is less costly than institutional care but definitely as important. Indeed, operational medicine is why the services medical departments exist.
Governing the MHS entails unique challenges and responsibilities. There aren't many systems that are as comprehensive and complicated in its missions or beneficiary population, nor do they have the diverse populations to service.
Comprehensive healthcare is due to service members and their families from the day a service member is accessioned into the military. This includes preventive care, education, treatment for injuries and illness, and convalescence 4 . Additionally, the MHS provides care to retired service members throughout their lives after active service.
Simply put, all aspects of care, across the health care continuum, must be accessible to beneficiaries, trained for, and maintained at the highest quality level.
In addition to operating its own hospitals and clinics, the MHS Enterprise oversees contractor operated health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, and fee for services provider based health care through TRICARE.
TRICARE is an effective business process of reimbursable care that the Defense Health Program (DHP) uses to address issues such as provider-patient relationships.
5
TRICARE was established-originally as CHAMPUS-in 1966 and expanded into its current form as TRICARE in 1993 6 . Retirees and family members of active duty and retired service members are entitled to care in the MHS on a space-available basis.
CHAMPUS and TRICARE were established to provide a broader base of provider services and to ensure that care was available in areas that were not served by MHS facilities.
Beneficiaries are spread across the globe which makes the MHS an international enterprise. Service members and their family members are assigned from Europe to the Far East, so governing the MHS is a challenge not limited to the contiguous United States. Overseas MHS managers must monitor foreign health care provider organizations that serve military beneficiaries through TRICARE. Providers have to be flexible and informed to stay abreast of an ever changing environment, leadership must continue to seek opportunities to better manage while never compromising the quality of care they are required to provide.
Another unique challenge for the MHS is that the providers are part of the beneficiary population. This challenge is manifested even more in the operational medical force 7 . Leadership is challenged to strike a balance between military readiness and the access to care. Tracking medical personnel across the force creates a natural tension in their ability to execute training and readiness requirements while continuing to serve the joint force population. Ten years of continuous war has taken its toll on a very small population of providers. Physicians, physician assistants, nurses, and medics have typically deployed and continue to deploy at least the same rates and in some cases even higher rates than their counterparts in other military occupational specialties 8 .
Military personnel are highly transient, which is a barrier to building strong provider/patient relationships. This fundamental difference between military and civilian healthcare populations can impede more effective care delivery. Physicians and treatment teams are constantly "starting over" with their patients instead of having a historical perspective on their patients that providers enjoy in other environments 9 . The military's 20 year retirement opportunity results in an ever-growing retiree population, which is further complicated by the fact that people live longer and remain in the Defense healthcare system even longer. The retiree beneficiary population's healthcare needs increase exponentially as they age.
The MHS must provide healthcare from institutional medical facilities to the theater of operations. It must also operate a highly complex logistics enterprise. The American people demand the highest standards of care for their troops regardless of where in the world they may be. Access to care, ensuring standards of care, and ensuring needed supplies and equipment are available, whether in the Washington DC suburbs or Bagram Airbase presents unique challenges to managing an already an already tough governance model in a seriously complicated enterprise 10 .
Governing DoD health is more complicated because the Army, Navy and Air An underlying and problematic assumption is that, absent a formal process to manage these independent medical systems, there will be unnecessary and inefficient duplication of services and/or missed opportunities for greater collaboration and sharing that result in sub-optimization of medical skills (for both graduate medical education and ongoing maintenance of provider currency)
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. It is also assumed that failing to create formal management structures (mission, staff, budget, outputs) results in increased costs due to less than full utilization of MHS resources to optimize healthcare delivery in a specified geographic area.
Most optimization recommendations center on MSM management and creating more efficient delivery of care in a specified geographic environment.
Recommendations usually do not address strategic medical Command and Control (C2) or streamlining operational medical readiness and care delivery; somehow, these issues avoid the core this debate.
There have been (and continue to be) a number of models proposed to enhance the integration of military medical care. . These MOUs though informal, serves the facilities well.
They provide flexibility and good training opportunities for the providers. It also fosters operating in a joint environment. Some of these agreements are long standing and have been inculcated in the normal business practice of these facilities.
Informal MSM Coordination. Military Treatment Facility (MTF) Commanders
meet and share information on an ongoing basis, but there is no requirement to formally collaborate, no identification of a "market manager," and no local oversight process to ensure inter-Service collaborative relationships are functioning in MSMs
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.
Studies have been conducted and task forces established to specifically look at these MHS market areas for opportunities for better efficiency and consolidation 19 .
There is also constant exploration for opportunities to address questions such as: . These COAs were compared for efficiency in the categories of duplication, mission delivery and costs.
 COA 1 is a Unified Medical Command responsible for C2 of medical structure.
 COA 2 is dual commands for C2, this COA allows multiple levels of capability area management.
 COA 3 is a single DoD medical service responsible to all services for healthcare delivery.
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Center for Naval Analysis Course of Action Evaluation Matrix
Course of Action techniques and procedures of how we do business in the DHP must be reviewed for efficiencies. In many cases, operating more jointly will deliver those efficiencies.
There is a belief that self-initiated efficiencies, already implemented to create pseudo-joint capabilities, have been enough; and that any more consolidation might impair readiness. While an interesting perspective and a plausible conclusion, it requires more scrutiny and data validate. There is also strong contention that operating jointly is an inherent process improvement since it presents leverage that would otherwise be unavailable to service unique programs. The important thing is that any decision be based not on rhetoric but on data and solid process improvement measures.
MHS Governance has been discussed at the highest levels of DoD. The topic has been vetted at the highest levels of military leadership both in the services and in the joint arenas
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. The real challenge is gaining service acceptance of a governance construct that removes the DHP budget from the control of service chiefs. The idea of a "Joint Medical Command" has been an agenda item for the Operational Deputies on more than one occasion, but has been tabled for future discussion and research 28 .
As noted, there are good examples of joint business processes that work well in the MHS, in medical logistics and supply chain management, information systems, and health education. Much has also been done in these capability areas at the operational levels in order to gain joint equity; however, there are several other capability portfolios that can become more joint to streamline the business processes. The greatest equities to be gained come from a top down approach that directs the enterprise into a joint environment; medical research and development comes to mind. The greatest and most effective reform however, has to occur in command and control of medical departments. C2 is where the "money is to be made".
Combining facilities, logistics acquisition, training and information system architecture seem to be more acceptable courses of action for the services. The fact is that these options allow the services to continue parochial business practices. There is nothing wrong with freedom of maneuver the services get from running their own healthcare delivery processes. There is also an element of trust that is missing in the services' medical cultures. The services have to believe that the support will be there when they need it . Similarities also exist in other areas to include research and development and physical examinations.
The services tend to focus most on the differences in the operational healthcare arena. As this is their raison d'etre, they should. Still, operational medicine is very similar from service to service in that it must be self sustaining and functional in an austere environment. There are differences in deployable medical systems, but they tend to be in sustainment and not actual execution. The field medical equipment that comprises the major components of deployable systems tends to be the same or similar across the force 33 .
There are two areas where this is not the case, delivering health care at sea and managing patients in the Air-Evac system. In both cases, there are service specific roles that are not replicated elsewhere and the services should retain executive agency over them. Otherwise patient care in a tactical environment ought to be far more standardized.
Opportunities
The question has been and continues to be how to find ways to do business that challenge normal business practices. The budgetary constraints that are about to affect DoD will have a direct effect on how DoD provides care to the beneficiary population.
The environment will get more complicated as time goes on. Ten years of conflict in the Middle East and in the global war on terrorism have left the US military with a complicated list of medical issues to deal with. Veterans face a wide range of health challenges, physical and psychological. These are long term and persistent issues and not easily fixed. There is a large cohort who will rely on the military health system for a long time. What further complicates the issue is that family members are also affected by their service-member's problems, particularly post-traumatic stress; they will also depend on the MHS.
There are cost / benefit issues associated with deferring patients to the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). In the long run, the costs are still a part of the overall cost of government health care, but they are not charged against DoD As noted, the DHP consists of many aspects spanning the military healthcare continuum, from first responder care, through evacuation, to hospitalization and convalescence. Services include preventative medicine, treatment of acute and chronic illnesses, emergency care, convalescent care, and ancillary services. These areas are broad but they are common in their execution across the DHP. It is in this arena that "service unique" requirements are considered. In examining these capability areas there are apparent joint equities and opportunities for better business process that would result not just in cost savings but also increase in readiness. . The requirement to provide far forward surgery is necessary as a combat multiplier in order to sustain the force. This requirement is not peculiar to the Army, especially in a Joint environment. The function of field surgery is usually executed by proximity and not service unique. The FST capability also closely resembles the Air Force Emergency Medical System (EMEDS) and the Navy's deployable medical capability. This is another aspect of operational care that offers potential savings through more joint efforts and standardization.
Treatment:
The commonalities in operation medicine treatment are boundless.
The CSH is very similar to EMEDS and the Navy field hospitals 38 . While each service has sustainability and logistics challenges, it would not be a great leap to morph a capability platform that could support all services and be sustained by all. This is one area that has the largest opportunities for savings and efficiencies since it is the area with the most equities. . Sustaining treatment facilities in a modern battle space is both cost prohibitive and high risk. Weapons systems now have reach and accuracy that did not exist in the past and place areas once deemed as "safe" rear areas at risk.
It is unlikely that we would deploy large medical treatment facilities to remain static and defenseless in future conflicts. The emphasis will be on robust evacuation and rightfully so. Such a shift presents an opportunity to adjust provider requirements numbers and seek further savings and efficiencies.
Evacuation: MEDEVAC platforms basically share the same requirements across the services
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. All services used ground vehicles, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft for strategic casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Enroute care is standard and critical in-flight surgery, treatment and stabilization contributes to the very high survivability rates we now enjoy. The challenge is that the capabilities, training and professional requirements are all very similar and require the same capabilities in all services.
Although the services may argue that their requirements are unique, closer examination would suggest that there are more similarities than differences. As previously operations, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and communications and so on. These billets aren't new, the bill payer would be GOFO slots already resident in the services and they would still maintain enough GOFO slots to deliver healthcare.
Once such a command is formed and given statutory authority, they can commence to assessing capability areas and develop ways to leverage equities. The difference with this process is that a Unified Medical Command can also implement programs and plans that are not hindered (as much) by parochialism. The difference in this initiative is that it is top down and not a bottom up approach which has proven ineffective. The military is a command and control organization and the culture responds to authority and there is no substitute. This process cannot be started by the services, this would require buy in and directive authority by the Secretariats, the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff, not to mention the SECDEF. There would be tremendous push back by the medical departments and even by service chiefs. It is not a function of it not being the right thing to do but a matter of culture and trust. Each service will have to believe that their partners will stand and deliver when the time comes.
Conclusion
A Unified Medical Command would not be an easy proposition, nor will it be a quick one. The challenge is that in an age of sequestration and budget cuts, all have to be fiscally responsible. The best way to do this is to look for equities and leverage common capabilities in ways that benefit all. The armed services of the United States will always fight in joint environments. Any opportunity to increase interdependence to meet common needs is common sense.
If we are going to see change that is truly sustainable and is adhered to and not subjected to interference from parochial service structures, we must have a Joint
Unified Medical Command. The concept of unity of command is tried and true in the military. Change can be "command directed" while still affording service input into the decision making processes through the design of the Unified Medical Command Staff.
There are probably not too many areas as conducive to joint command and control in the military as healthcare delivery. This proposal will not solve the DoD budget issues, nor will it fix all the challenges in the military healthcare system; but there is no denying that there are opportunities to do business better. It is time to do away with collaborative efforts and start focusing on command directed solutions. C2 is clearly the military way of doing business and has always been effective. We should always look for opportunities to improve process, this one is clear; the DoD healthcare system deserves a Joint Unified Medical Command. 31 Services healthcare mission and service to their beneficiaries per HQ MACOM staffs: Surgeons Generals of the services MHS management of healthcare delivery. 32 Service medical logistics processes in medical facilities, R&D command and physical exams processes: Acquisition, distribution and medical materiel contracting in healthcare facilities. 33 Military Deployable Medical Systems acquisition and maintenance programs. Joint medical logistics command at Ft. Detrick, MD. Operational medical care delivery platforms for each service. 34 Department of Veteran's Affairs operations and missions: The DVA cooperates with DoD to deliver continued healthcare to service members: VA operates the nation's largest integrated health care system with more than 1,400 sites of care, including hospitals, community clinics, community living centers, domiciliary, readjustment counseling centers, and various other facilities. For additional information on VA health care, visit www.va.gov/health. 38 Service Medical Doctrine for healthcare delivery across the operational force: each service has medical care doctrine that is documented in their service manuals. 39 OIF and OEF Theatre evacuation policy processes, casualty evacuation numbers and times. Traditional evacuation of casualties has been immediately after stabilization. Hospitalization in the AOR was not the emphasis. 40 Service Medical Doctrine for healthcare delivery across the operational force: Medical Center and Schools and centers of excellence for each service. Healthcare delivery doctrine across the joint force.
